This paper analyses the optimal monetary policy of a government facing an election, whose disinflationary 'abilities' are uncertain, under the assumption that reducing inflation is costly because of backward-looking contracts. It is shown that if the government likes to be in power it can choose to 'do nothing' on the inflation front in order to avoid risking electoral defeat should disinflation prove too costly. The costs of inflation reduction are worth bearing if initial inflation is sufficiently high: therefore it is possible to observe quick disinflations that however stop short of low inflation.
Introduction
The presence of inertial factors in wage and price formation, such as lagged wage indexation, is mentioned as a main obstacle to disinflation and as a cause of output decline in many studies of disinflationary attempts. This paper addresses the issue of the optimal speed of disinflation when such inertial factors are present, ' Milesi-Ferretti/European Economic Review 39 (1995 ) 1385 -1404 and studies how electoral uncertainty affects the determination of monetary policy. The interaction between inertial factors and political uncertainty provides a possible explanation as to why disinflation may proceed too slowly, and why a disinflation program may be stopped, postponed or not adopted at all. In particular, the analysis provides one rationale for the stylized fact that successful inflation reduction plans often stop short of full disinflation, so that the inflation rate remains in double-digits. 2 In practice, the factors highlighted in this paper are likely to interact with the credibility of disinflation plans (not explicitly considered here) since credibility may depend on whether the government is perceived to be able to reduce inertial factors.
It is often argued that governments may refrain from embarking on anti-inflationary programs for fear of the short-run economic costs that these programs might entail. It is possible that in the long run these costs are worth bearing in exchange for a lower inflation regime; therefore a government which takes a sufficiently 'long-term' view would not be discouraged by the presence of short-run costs of adjustment. A common explanation of why governments do not take this long-term view is that in a democratic regime with frequent elections the government in power is not sure of reappointment.
If voters dislike high unemployment the government may choose not to implement a disinflationary program close to an election year, for fear that a recession would cause its electoral defeat. 3 This explanation seems to rely on voters being myopic; if it is common knowledge that a disinflationary program is costly but voters agree that the long-run benefits exceed the costs then there is no reason why -in a situation of temporarily high unemployment -rational forward-looking voters should throw the incumbent out of office.
In this paper I construct a simple model in which it may be rational for a government facing an election not to embark on a disinflationary program, even though voters' behaviour is forward-looking.
Three key assumptions are behind this result. First, disinflation entails unavoidable output costs, but these costs are uncertain. Second, the government stakes political capital when it starts a disinflationary program: voters are likely to interpret unsuccessful or costly programs as a signal of government's incompetence. By devoting political capital to inflation reduction, the government forgoes the option of exploiting an incumbency bias. 4
